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I
n the last half century, Japan has exercised an enormously beneﬁcial in-
ﬂuence on the world. After the end of World War II, it not only adopted
democracy, but it also showed that non-Western countries could combine
democracy with attainment of Western living standards. By embracing the use
of Western technology and combining it with thrift and hard work, Japan mod-
ernized its economy and grew at double-digit rates for two decades in the 1950s
and 1960s.
By the early 1970s, Japan took advantage of economies of scale in manu-
facturing and exported automobiles, steel, ships, and other manufactured goods
to the world. By the early 1980s, it aggressively adopted new technology to
create a range of electronic consumer goods for export, such as cameras and
VCRs. At that point, Japan had also moved beyond importing innovative tech-
nology from the West to exporting its own innovations, such as just-in-time
manufacturing techniques. More important, the range and quality of goods
offered by Japanese ﬁrms forced Western companies to remain dynamic and
competitive.
Over the post–World War II period, Japan has implemented a variety of
monetary regimes. The world can learn valuable economic lessons from Japan
by studying its monetary history. Japanese monetary policy divides naturally
into two time periods separated by 1987. The ﬁrst part includes the high inﬂa-
tion of the early 1970s and the establishment of price stability by the mid-1980s.
The second part includes the boom-bust episode known as the bubble.1
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The variety of monetary regimes implemented by Japan produced the re-
sults shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Figure 1 shows quarterly observations
of four-quarter percentage changes in money (M2+CDs) and nominal output
(GDP).2 Figure 2 reproduces the nominal output growth series of Figure 1 and
adds real output growth. Figure 3 shows inﬂation measured by the GDP price
deﬂator. Inﬂation is the difference between nominal and real output growth.
The rest of the article attempts to breathe some life into these data series.
1. BRETTON WOODS
Until the demise of Bretton Woods in early 1973, Japan pegged the foreign
exchange value of the yen to the dollar. With a pegged exchange rate and with
U.S. prices beyond Japanese control, the Japanese price level had to adjust
to achieve balance of payments equilibrium. To maintain ongoing balance in
its external accounts, Japanese baseline inﬂation had to match U.S. inﬂation.3
Furthermore, as Japanese goods became more desirable to the rest of the world,
their prices had to rise an additional amount. That is, a favorable change in
the terms of trade required inﬂation in Japan beyond what was occurring at the
time in the United States.
The external constraints imposed by a system of pegged exchange rates
required the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to set its discount rate with the objective
of targeting the current account balance rather than the state of the domestic
economy. At times of current account surpluses, the BoJ lowered its discount
rate and money growth and inﬂation rose. Similarly, at times of current account
deﬁcits, the BoJ raised its discount rate and money growth and inﬂation fell
(see Ueda [1997]; Suzuki [1985]; and Yeager [1976]). Changes in economic
activity followed changes in money growth with a lag of about three quarters
(Yeager 1976, p. 526).
The pegged exchange rate regime served Japan well. In the 1960s, Japan’s
economy grew rapidly. From 1960 through 1969, Japanese real GDP grew at
an annualized rate of 10.4 percent. A major reason for this growth was Japan’s
ability to mass-produce goods, such as compact automobiles, in big demand by
consumers in the West. With its exchange rate pegged at 360 yen to the dollar,
the resulting favorable change in the terms of trade required a rise in Japanese
prices relative to U.S. prices. From 1961 through 1970, the difference between
Japanese and U.S. (GDP deﬂator) inﬂation rates was 3 percentage points.
2 All references to the Japanese money stock are for M2+CDs.
3 Baseline inﬂation is for traded goods. High productivity growth in the traded goods sector
meant that the prices of services and wages rose faster than the prices of traded goods.    
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Notes: Quarterly observations of four-quarter percentage changes of money (M2+CDs) and nom-
inal output (GDP). Heavy tick marks indicate fourth quarter of year.



















Notes: Quarterly observations of four-quarter percentage changes of real and nominal output
(GDP). Heavy tick marks indicate fourth quarter of year.    
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Figure 3 Inﬂation in Japan
















Notes: Quarterly observations of four-quarter percentage changes in prices (GDP price deﬂator).
Heavy tick marks indicate fourth quarter of year.
Even with this difference in inﬂation rates, the yen was seriously under-
valued by 1971. In the ﬁrst half of the 1960s, the United States achieved near
price stability. From 1960 through 1964, inﬂation rose in the United States
at an annualized rate of only 1.4 percent. Then, from 1965 through 1970,
U.S. inﬂation rose at an annualized rate of 4.1 percent. In Japan, on the other
hand, inﬂation rose at an annualized rate of 5.8 percent between 1960 and
1965. Higher inﬂation in Japan than in the United States reﬂected the favor-
able change in Japan’s terms of trade. However, from 1966 through 1969, the
rate of Japanese inﬂation did not increase in line with U.S. inﬂation—in fact,
at 5.7 percent, it remained at almost the same prior rate. So by early 1971, the
yen was seriously undervalued and the dollar overvalued.
An overvalued dollar forced a change in U.S. policy in summer 1971. Ear-
lier, in 1970, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) lowered short-term interest rates
in response to U.S. recession. Capital then ﬂowed out of the United States,
further weakening the dollar. In 1971, the U.S. trade balance turned negative—
for the ﬁrst time in the twentieth century. On August 15, 1971, President Nixon
announced measures to force a devaluation of the dollar. He closed the gold
window to foreign central banks and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports
into the United States. The surcharge gave the United States a club with which
to force foreign countries like Japan to revalue their currencies relative to the
dollar.    
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Figure 4 Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate










Notes: Quarterly observations of yen/dollar exchange rate. Heavy tick marks indicate fourth
quarter of year.
Investors knew that foreign currencies could only rise in value relative to
the dollar, so they ﬂooded foreign central banks like the BoJ with dollars for
conversion into their currencies. The BoJ purchased dollars in an attempt to
maintain the existing parity of 360 yen to the dollar. The resulting increase
in high-powered money allowed a surge in Japanese money creation starting
in 1971Q3, followed by a surge in nominal GDP in 1972 (Figure 1). Money
growth peaked at almost 25 percent in early 1973, and nominal GDP growth
peaked at almost 20 percent in 1974.
In response to the turbulent events of the year, Japan, along with other
member countries of the Bretton Woods system, agreed to a devaluation of the
dollar in December 1971. In particular, Japan agreed to a revaluation of the yen
relative to the dollar of 16.9 percent, along with a margin of ﬂuctuation of 2 1/4
percent (Figure 4). However, the devaluation was insufﬁcient, and by summer
1972, the yen had risen to its new ceiling. The BoJ then had to resume buying
dollars and expanding its domestic money stock. In early February 1973, as
inﬂation rose sharply in the United States, the dollar again weakened. Rather
than continue large-scale intervention to support the dollar, the BoJ let the yen
ﬂoat. In early March 1973, the entire Bretton Woods system collapsed.
Japan’s experience demonstrated to the countries of the Bretton Woods
system (other than the United States) that if they wanted to control their own
inﬂation rates they had to gain control over the rate at which their central         
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banks created money. They realized that to do so, they would have to allow
their currencies to ﬂoat against the dollar.
2. THE GOLDEN AGE OF JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY
After the system of pegged exchange rates came to an end, the BoJ moved
decisively to gain control over money creation and inﬂation. The three-month
Gensaki rate (a market rate on three-month repurchase agreements) went from
5.5 percent in 1973Q1 to 17.5 percent in 1974Q1 (Figure 5). Money growth,
which had risen at an annual rate of 25 percent over the two and one-half years
ending in 1973Q2, fell sharply to rates between 10 and 15 percent (Figure
1). Inﬂation (GDP deﬂator) peaked at about 27 percent (annualized rate) in
1974Q2 but then fell rapidly (Figure 3).
For more than a decade the BoJ concentrated on restoring and maintaining
price stability. Suzuki (1985, p. 3) emphasizes the importance the BoJ attached
to the behavior of money:4
Since 1975, when the Bank of Japan began to watch the money supply as
an intermediate target, ﬂuctuations in the growth rate of money stock have
become small. They have remained in a range of § 2.5% deviation from the
trend line....A tt h esame time, the trend rate of monetary growth itself
has been declining gradually, dropping from 15% [in the mid-1970s] to 7-8%
recently [1985]. Consequently, the rate of growth of nominal GNP has also
declined in the same way. It is interesting to note, however, that the decline in
the growth rate of nominal GNP manifested itself as a decline in the inﬂation
r a t e...without affecting the growth rate of real GNP.
Suzuki (1985, p. 6, and 1986, p. 192) also emphasizes that the BoJ viewed
moderate money growth as essential to achieve credibility for its policy of
lowering inﬂation. Hutchison (1988), on the basis of empirical estimation of a
reaction function for the BoJ, concludes that the BoJ used money (M2+CDs)
as an intermediate target.
The BoJ, however, never put in place explicit procedures for monetary con-
trol (Ito 1989). Suzuki (1985, p. 6) explains that an explicit target for money
would have limited the independence of monetary policy because of political
pressure to set the target to conform with the ofﬁcial economic forecast of the
government. Further, Suzuki (1984, p. 39, and 1985, p. 5) states that the BoJ
considered one to two years as the time period for which monetary control
mattered. Moreover, based on an examination of the determinants of changes
in the BoJ’s discount rate, Ueda (1997, p. 263) writes, “. . . before 1974,
monetary policy...responded only to the current account, while since then
4 In the 1980s, Suzuki was Director of the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies at
the Bank of Japan.    
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Figure 5 Japanese Three-Month Gensaki Rate



















Notes: Quarterly observations of three-month government Treasury bill with Repurchase Agree-
ment (Gensaki) rate. Heavy tick marks indicate fourth quarter of year.
it has responded also to inﬂation and GDP developments.” To summarize, in
setting its discount rate, the BoJ responded to observed economic conditions
rather than attempting to achieve short-term stability of money growth.
During the period that began in the last half of 1973 and continued through
the end of 1986, the BoJ basically pursued nominal expenditure targeting using
a simple feedback rule for changing short-term interest rates. That is, Japan
relied on standard “lean-against-the-wind” procedures where it set its interest
rate instrument in response to economic activity. In this way, the BoJ achieved
the moderate money growth necessary to control inﬂation indirectly rather than
directly through operationally binding short-term money targets. Nevertheless,
money growth acted as a constraint because the BoJ tied the credibility of its
goal of restoring price stability to long-run moderation in money growth.
Abandonment of pegged exchange rates in favor of ﬂoating exchange rates
allowed the BoJ to gain control over the reserve creation of the banking system
and ultimately over money creation. The BoJ-engineered reduction in money
growth and inﬂation initiated a profound change in professional and popular
views about the nature of inﬂation. Inﬂation came to be seen as a monetary
rather than a nonmonetary phenomenon. In time, Japan, as well as other coun-
tries, assigned responsibility for the control of inﬂation to their central banks.
The 1970s produced not only high inﬂation but also stagﬂation—the si-
multaneous occurrence of inﬂation and unemployment. Stagﬂation provided
the empirical impetus for the rise of the rational-expectations school, which   
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initially emphasized the role expectations play in explaining the interaction
of real and monetary phenomena. As exposited by Milton Friedman (1968)
and Robert Lucas (1981), the natural-rate/rational-expectations version of the
Phillips curve implies that the existing empirical correlation between inﬂation
and the unemployment rate derives from unanticipated, rather than anticipated,
changes in inﬂation. From an inﬂation rate of 15 percent in 1976, Japan es-
sentially returned to price stability by 1982. The fact that it did so without a
recession supported this formulation of the Phillips curve.
3. THE OIL PRICE SHOCKS
In the 1970s, some economists blamed the dramatic surges in inﬂation that
occurred during that period on special factors, especially the two oil price
increases engineered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). The ﬁrst increase began in October 1973 and the second in December
1978. It is difﬁcult to assess this special-factors explanation of inﬂation because
prior to both oil price shocks, money growth had risen signiﬁcantly in major
industrial countries. When one assigns responsibility for inﬂation, he must then
disentangle the effects of a highly expansionary monetary policy from the ef-
fects of the oil price rise. In the case of the second oil price shock, however,
Japan had broken ranks with other major countries in its pursuit of a disinﬂation-
ary monetary policy. As a result, Japan offers as close to a controlled experiment
as economists can obtain for assessing the oil price explanation of inﬂation.
In the case of the ﬁrst oil price shock, a problem with the special-factors
explanation is that inﬂation had already started to rise before the shock. The
sharp rise in the price of oil occurred after 1973Q3 with the start of the October
Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. From September 1973 to March 1974, the
price of oil (Saudi Arabian light-34 crude) rose from $2.80 a barrel to $9.60
a barrel. In Japan, CPI inﬂation had run around 4.5 percent in the last half of
1972. However, by 1973Q3, it had already risen to 12.8 percent.
Prior to the second oil price shock, as opposed to the ﬁrst, monetary policy
had fairly persistently concentrated on lowering inﬂation. The second shock
began in 1978Q4 when the price of oil jumped from $12.80 a barrel to $40 a
barrel by 1979Q4. One can look at the inﬂation bulge following the oil price
rise to measure the impact of that rise on inﬂation. Because Japan imports most
of its fuel, the rise in the price of oil directly affected its wholesale price index
of raw materials, which includes the prices of imported raw materials. This
index increased 73.7 percent in the 12 months ending March 1980 (Suzuki
1981, pp. 408–09).
These price rises passed on to the broad-based GDP deﬂator but to a much
lesser extent. The GDP inﬂation rate rose signiﬁcantly only in two quarters,
1980Q2 and 1980Q3, when it rose at an annualized rate of 9.9 and 8.3 percent,
respectively. Figure 3, which shows four-quarter percentage changes in the GDP     
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deﬂator, reveals the inﬂation bulge. By this measure, inﬂation rose temporarily
from a low value of 2.1 percent (for the four quarters ending 1979Q3) to a
peak of 6.6 percent (for the four quarters ending 1980Q3).
However, this rise of a maximum of 4.5 percentage points in the inﬂation
rate for four-quarter changes in inﬂation overstates the impact of the oil price
rise. Prior to the rise, the value of the yen had risen dramatically (Figure 4).
The rise in the yen-dollar exchange rate from 290 in early 1977 to 190 by
late 1978 amounted to a one-third appreciation. The appreciation produced a
transitory reduction in inﬂation lasting into 1979 that exaggerated the size of the
inﬂation bulge shown in Figure 3. At the time, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) attributed some of the low inﬂation
prior to this bulge to the one-time effect of lower import prices produced by a
rising yen (Yeager 1981, p. 169).
The inﬂation rate for the eight quarters prior to the rise in GDP inﬂation
(from 1977Q4 to 1979Q3) was 3.4 percent. In the subsequent four quarters
(1979Q4 to 1980Q3), the inﬂation rate rose to 6.6 percent. In the next four
quarters (1980Q4 to 1981Q3), it fell back to 3.3 percent. The rise in the middle
four quarters of about 3.2 percentage points appears to be a reasonable estimate
of the direct effect of the oil price rise.
At the time, some economists argued that, to avoid adverse effects on
output, central banks should allow a rise in the money stock to accommodate
increases in the price level caused by relative price increases. However, the BoJ
continued to concentrate on maintaining the public’s expectation of inﬂation
at a moderate level. With the occurrence of the oil price shock in late 1978,
the BoJ began to raise short-term interest rates from their level of about 4.25
percent. In late 1979, when broad measures of inﬂation began to rise, it raised
rates sharply until they exceeded 12 percent by March 1980. Consequently,
money growth fell from 11.7 percent in the four quarters ending 1979Q3 to
8.2 percent in the ﬁve quarters ending 1980Q4.
Despite the aggressive actions taken by the BoJ to contain inﬂation and
despite the importance of imported oil to Japan, the effect of the oil price rise
on output appears to have been moderate. Over the period of unusual price rise
(1979Q4 to 1980Q3), real GDP growth was 2 percent. Over the subsequent
ten years, real GDP growth averaged an annualized 4.2 percent. It thus appears
that the oil price shock reduced real output growth about 2 percentage points
for one year.
Although oil imports had risen in importance by the end of the decade, the
second oil price shock affected inﬂation and real output much less adversely
than the ﬁrst.5 Monetary policy made the difference. In the ﬁrst instance, the
5 In 1972 and 1973, oil imports amounted to 2 percent of GDP. In 1979, they amounted to
4.4 percent of GDP and in 1980, 6.6 percent (Hutchison 1991, p. 10).      
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BoJ concentrated on reducing the size of the balance of payments surplus
and on minimizing the impact on the economy of the yen revaluation agreed
to in December 1971 (Ueda 1993, p. 200). In the second instance, the BoJ
concentrated on retaining credibility for its inﬂation objective. The change in
the behavior of wages in the second period compared to the ﬁrst shows that
the BoJ succeeded. In 1973 and 1974, nominal wage growth reached 21.9 and
29.1 percent, respectively. In 1980, nominal wage growth rose only slightly to
6.6 percent, from 5.9 percent in 1978 and 6.5 percent in 1979 (Ueda 1993, p.
201).
Japanese experience with the second oil price shock demonstrated that
relative price shocks can exert a transitory inﬂuence on inﬂation. However, the
contrasting experience between the ﬁrst and second oil price shocks demon-
strated the importance of the monetary regime in place. Random perturbations
in the price level due to one-time effects exert minimal impact on real economic
activity and no inﬂuence on trend inﬂation if the public believes that the central
bank will maintain long-run price stability.
4. A RETURN TO EXCHANGE RATE TARGETING
In the last half of the 1980s, the BoJ moved away from stabilizing nominal
expenditure and money growth. Instead, it began to attach importance once
again to stabilizing the exchange rate. Especially after the Louvre Accord of
February 1987, the BoJ limited interest rate increases to restrain appreciation
of the yen.
As explained in Section 1, in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the central
bank responds to a positive, rising balance of payments by lowering the dis-
count rate. Starting in 1986, the BoJ moved partway back toward this monetary
regime through a dirty ﬂoat. That is, the BoJ lowered short-term interest rates in
response to a positive current account balance and an appreciating yen. Lower
interest rates made monetary policy expansionary.
An expansionary monetary policy dealt with both domestic and foreign
pressures. Japanese exporters wanted the government to stimulate domestic
demand to cushion the adverse effect of an appreciating yen on their exports.
Furthermore, the U.S. government wanted Japan to stimulate domestic demand
as a way of reducing its payments surplus through increased imports. By 1986,
a rising Japanese trade surplus had kindled protectionist sentiment in the U.S.
Congress, which threatened Japan with retaliatory trade measures.6
While the dollar rose in value against the currencies of other countries in
the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, the yen maintained its value. Starting in early 1985,
6 These comments follow the discussion in Volcker and Gyohten (1992, pp. 248–58); James
(1996, pp. 433–53); Ueda (1997, pp. 264–65, and 1993, pp. 207–09); and Sawamoto and Ichikawa
(1994, pp. 94–96).    
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Figure 6 Japanese Current Account as a Percentage of GDP


















Notes: Quarterly observations of current account balance divided by GDP. Heavy tick marks
indicate fourth quarter of year.
the dollar began to depreciate against other currencies and the yen. The yen
appreciated dramatically, rising from about 260 yen to the dollar in early 1985
to about 125 in early 1988. In response, the Japanese current account fell from
early 1987 on, but only slowly (Figure 6).
In the September 1985 Plaza Agreement, the Group of Five countries had
agreed to encourage the depreciation of the dollar that had begun earlier in the
year. However, the continued strong Japanese current account balance even-
tually changed the focus from intervening in the foreign exchange market to
raising Japanese imports by stimulating domestic demand in Japan. The Louvre
Accord of February 1987 committed Japan to reducing its balance of payments
surplus through an expansion of aggregate demand. From 7 percent in 1985Q4,
the BoJ pushed the three-month Gensaki rate to 3.75 percent in 1987Q3.
Japan’s money growth began to rise in 1987Q1. From an annualized rate of
8.1 percent from 1982Q1 through 1986Q4, it rose to 11.3 percent from 1987Q1
through 1990Q2. Because the Japanese public had come to expect price stabil-
ity, the higher money growth initially impacted primarily real variables (GDP
growth and real wealth) rather than prices. As a result, real GDP growth began
to rise in 1987Q3. From an average annualized rate of 3.3 percent from 1980Q1
through 1987Q2, it rose to 5.7 percent from 1987Q3 through 1990Q2 (Figure
2). In 1989Q2 inﬂation began to rise. From an average annualized rate of 1
percent from 1985Q1 through 1989Q1, it rose to 2.8 percent from 1989Q2
through 1991Q4.      
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5. TARGETING ASSET PRICES
The rise in asset prices in the latter part of the 1980s came to be known as the
bubble. As noted, CPI inﬂation rose only moderately in this period. The BoJ
concluded that inﬂation targeting was inappropriate: instead of varying its pol-
icy instrument (the level of short-term interest rates) in response to the observed
behavior of the prices of goods and services, it should respond to asset prices.7
The BoJ believed that large rises in asset prices would inevitably be reversed
with deleterious effects on the ﬁnancial system and on real growth.8 The belief
held by many in Japan that the rise in asset prices, by exacerbating disparities
of wealth, undermined the egalitarian character of Japanese society reinforced
the BoJ’s determination to limit those price rises (Ueda 1993, p. 205).
The asset price targeting of the post-bubble period can be understood as
analogous to a commodity standard monetary regime. Instead of ﬁxing the
nominal price of an asset like gold, the central bank attempted to inﬂuence
the nominal price of a much broader collection of assets—the country’s repro-
ducible and nonreproducible capital stock (equities and land). The situation was
analogous to that of England’s return to the gold standard in 1926 at the pre–
World War I parity for sterling. The Bank of England had to force a deﬂation of
the general price level to bring about a reduction in the price of gold. Assuming
that a signiﬁcant part of the rise in Japan’s asset prices derived from real factors,
the BoJ policy of lowering the yen price of assets required deﬂation in goods
prices. As a result, Japanese monetary policy became strongly contractionary
in mid-1990.
The expansionary monetary policy that began in 1987 had raised the real
price of assets such as land. However, monetary expansion was not the sole
source of the rise. The rise in asset prices also derived signiﬁcantly from real
factors. In the late 1980s, the price of land rose as Tokyo became an Asian
center for growth of the service and information sectors. The deregulation of
Japanese ﬁnancial markets in the 1980s also increased Tokyo’s attractiveness
as an international ﬁnancial center (Sawamoto and Ichikawa 1994, p. 91).
In May 1989, with an increase in the discount rate, the BoJ began pushing
interest rates up sharply. The Gensaki rate went from 4.3 percent in 1989Q2
to 7.6 percent in 1990Q4 and 1991Q1. Reﬂecting the rate increase, money
growth began to fall in 1990Q3, even becoming negative for three quarters
7 For example, Sawamoto and Ichikawa (1994, p. 100) note, “It may be said that this argu-
ment is widely accepted, although opinions differ as to the desirability of making the stability of
asset prices part of a target for monetary policy.... ”
8 For example, the governor of the BoJ, Yasushi Mieno (1994, p. 9), stated in a speech, “. . .
it is apparent that with large ﬂuctuations in asset prices since the second half of the 1980s, major
ﬂuctuations occurred in the economy as well, and sustainable growth was undermined. Therefore,
asset price ﬂuctuations are clearly a cause as well as a signal of ﬂuctuations in economic activity.
It is for this reason that the Bank of Japan includes asset price developments among the variables
that it monitors.”      
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after 1992Q1. Real GDP barely grew from 1992Q2 through 1995Q1.9 From a
peak of about 38,000 in early 1990, the Nikkei stock index fell to about 15,000
in 1992. Land prices began falling in 1991 and have continued falling to date.
It is essential to distinguish between shocks and the mechanisms that prop-
agate those shocks. The initial shock was monetary—a rise in interest rates
engineered through monetary contraction. The subsequent fall in asset prices
reﬂected in part the direct effect of the rise in interest rates and in part the in-
direct effect of recession on expected future earnings. The reduction in wealth
then propagated the real effects of the original monetary shock. One by-product
of the fall in wealth was the creation of a mass of bad debts in the banking
system. By reducing the efﬁcacy of ﬁnancial intermediation, those debts in turn
ampliﬁed the original shock to the real economy.10
The fall in asset prices, which began in early 1990, came to be seen as
precipitating the downturn—an inevitable collapse of a speculative bubble.
The resulting mass of bad debts was the mechanism that propagated the shock.
While superﬁcially plausible, such an explanation is unsatisfactory. Japan had
experienced a massive loss of wealth in World War II. Furthermore, the war
9 For a discussion of Japanese monetary policy in the early nineties, see Goodfriend (1997).
10 There is an analogy with U.S. monetary policy in the Depression. In the United States
during the 1920s, the opportunities for growth appeared to have greatly expanded with the advent
of mass production. The stock market rose accordingly. The Federal Reserve interpreted the rise as
evidence of speculative extension of credit and initiated a rise in interest rates through a monetary
contraction. The Fed then administered additional shocks. In fall 1931, it raised the discount rate
sharply when Britain abandoned the gold standard. In spring 1932, it allowed a signiﬁcant number
of banks to close through bank runs.
The depressed state of the stock market during the Depression made the 1928 rise in the
stock market appear to be a bubble. And the low level of interest rates made monetary policy
appear impotent. The Fed restricted itself to preventing another presumed speculative rise in credit.
Accordingly, in 1936 and 1937, it raised required reserves ratios sharply. The money stock then
fell and economic recovery turned into renewed economic decline. Milton Friedman summarizes
the conventional view of monetary policy in the Depression, a view which he and Anna Schwartz
challenge in their 1963 book A Monetary History of the United States, in the following:
Beginning in mid-1928, the Federal Reserve System, concerned about stock market
speculation, adopted a monetary policy of nearly continuous restraint....[In] the great
contraction from 1929–1933...t h eSystem pleaded impotence, arguing explicitly that
the non-monetary forces making for contraction were so strong and violent that it was
powerless to stem the tide, and implicitly that the depth of the decline in the money
stock was due to the depth of the decline in business activity, rather than...t h ereverse
(Friedman [1967] 1969, pp. 89 and 91).
The belief that the Depression was the result of a breakdown in ﬁnancial intermediation that
was produced by prior unrestrained speculation spurred the creation of numerous public agencies
to revive lending. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, started in the Hoover Administration,
purchased the bad debts of banks and large corporations. Congress created the Federal Home
Loan Bank System in 1932 to provide credit to housing. In 1933, Congress created the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Also in that year, it created Production Credit Associations and
Banks for Cooperatives to stimulate lending to farmers. However, the failure of these measures to
end the Depression indicates that the bad debts were a by-product, not a cause, of the Depression.        
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had disrupted its ﬁnancial system. However, this catastrophe did not produce
economic stagnation. Instead the Japanese responded by increasing their sup-
ply of labor, and output rose dramatically. Why would they respond differently
later?
The story that Japan’s economic distress resulted from the collapse of a
speculative bubble contained dramatic elements of greed and retribution, el-
ements with mass appeal. That explanation relegated monetary policy to the
role of avoiding future speculative bubbles. As a result, monetary policy did
not relieve the relentless pressure for price deﬂation.
6. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE MONETARY SHOCK
One can measure the magnitude of the monetary shock by determining the
extent to which actual money growth has fallen short of the growth consis-
tent with price stability.11 Formula (1), the equation of exchange, aids in the
calculation:
˙ m = ˙ p + ˙ k + ˙ y (1)
From left to right, the variables of (1) are growth in money, inﬂation,
growth in the demand for real money expressed as a fraction of real expendi-
ture, and growth in real expenditure. One can substitute into (1) trend values for
growth of k and y that abstract from the monetary disturbances of the nineties.
Figure 7 shows values of k from 1970Q1 through 1998Q4. (The slope of the
trend line is the trend growth in k.) They rise secularly until the monetary
contraction of the nineties. The growth of k from 1970 through 1990 is 2.2
percent. The ﬁgure used in equation (1) for growth in real expenditure (output)
comes from the sum of labor-force growth and an estimate of longer-term
productivity growth. From 1990Q1 through 1994Q4, the labor force grew at
an annualized rate of 1 percent. From 1980Q1 through 1987Q2, the period
before the monetary expansion of the late 1980s, labor productivity (real GDP
per worker) grew at an annualized rate of 2.3 percent. The sum (1 plus 2.3)
implies a ﬁgure for trend real output growth of 3.3 percent in the ﬁrst half of
the nineties. The sum of this ﬁgure and secular growth in k (2.2 percent) gives
5.5 percent as the rate of growth of money consistent with price stability.
The 5.5 percent ﬁgure for noninﬂationary money growth is based on labor-
force growth of 1 percent. At present, the working-age population is no longer
growing (OECD 1997, p. 113), so noninﬂationary trend money growth is prob-
ably near 4.5 percent. Nevertheless, the 5.5 percent ﬁgure applies to most of the
nineties. From 1991Q1 through 1998Q4, money grew at an annualized rate of
11 The calculations are for measured price stability. Biases in measurement of the price level
in Japan make measured price stability consistent with deﬂation of 1 to 2 percent.       
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Figure 7 The Ratios of Nonmonetary Wealth and Money to Expenditure




















Notes: The solid line is the logarithmic ratio of money (M2+CDs) to GDP. The trend lines are
ﬁtted to this series for the intervals 1970 to 1990 and 1991 to 1998. The dashed line is the
logarithmic ratio of nonmonetary wealth to GDP. Wealth is from Sekine (1998) and includes
ﬁnancial assets such as land, housing, and inventories. Heavy tick marks indicate fourth quarter
of year.
only 2.4 percent. This shortfall of about 3 percentage points in noninﬂationary
money growth for eight years implies that the price level would have had to
fall 24 percent to avoid any adverse impact on the real economy.
Even though this ﬁgure appears large, it ignores factors that might have
increased the demand for money and thus required an even greater fall in
the price level. First, the level of short-term interest rates is at historically
low levels in Japan. The three-month Gensaki rate fell to only 0.3 percent
starting in 1995Q4. At such low interest rates, the demand for money may
increase signiﬁcantly (Wolman 1997). Second, uncertainty may have increased
the demand for money.12 For example, uncertainty over the extent of the ﬁ-
nancial sector safety net in the fall of 1997 caused by the failure of Yamaichi
Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank may have increased the demand for
money. The relatively rapid growth of narrow money (M1) in 1997 and 1998
12 [Households] “have become extremely risk averse in their portfolio allocation behaviour.
.............[H]ouseholds have shifted their portfolios, as mentioned, towards bank deposits [and]
currency” (OECD 1998, p. 51).       
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relative to broad money (M2+CDs) may be evidence of an increased demand
for liquidity.13
7. MONETARY NONNEUTRALITY
The magnitude of the monetary shock can also be seen through the fall in
the trend rate of growth of money. Money growth was at an annualized rate
of 9.5 percent over the ten-year period ending 1990Q2. It then fell to only
1.1 percent from 1991Q1 through 1994Q2. With a lag of almost two years,
in 1992Q1 inﬂation did begin to fall, but only enough to produce moderate
deﬂation. Economists disagree about why the price level adjusts sluggishly in
response to nominal monetary disturbances. Ironically, the BoJ’s hard-earned
credibility for maintaining price stability very likely impeded a large-scale,
sustained deﬂation.14
Growth of both real expenditure and real wealth adjusted in response to
contractionary monetary policy.15 Money growth fell 6.9 percentage points
over the eight-year interval of 1990Q3 to 1998Q4 relative to the prior ten-year
interval. Had inﬂation adjusted with complete ﬂexibility, nominal GDP growth
would have fallen by the same amount. Instead, it fell only 4.1 percentage
points. That fall divided into a 1.1 percentage point reduction in GDP inﬂation
and a 2.9 percentage point reduction in real GDP growth. Much of the real
13 In 1997 and 1998, M1 grew at an annualized rate of about 8.5 percent, and M2 grew at
about 3.6 percent.
14 There are no direct observations of expectations of inﬂation in Japan. It seems plausible
that the consistent policy of restoring price stability pursued by the BoJ from the mid-1970s to
the mid-1980s earned it credibility. One piece of supporting evidence is the limited effect on
inﬂation and wages of the price rises associated with the second oil price shock. Another piece of
evidence that establishes the credibility of the BoJ’s commitment to price stability comes from the
coexistence of low government ten-year benchmark bond rates with a high and rising government
debt-to-GDP ratio. At least through 1998, the public must have assigned no probability to central
bank monetization of government debt.
15 One reader pointed out that economists have been unable to construct models capable
of explaining protracted slowdowns in real growth. The primary nonmonetary model is the real
business cycle model, where recessions occur because of negative productivity shocks. How-
ever, economists have been unable to identify such shocks independently of the data series to
be explained—real output. Monetary models emphasize either unanticipated monetary shocks or
staggered price setting, perhaps because of contractual arrangements. In the former case, the
monetary nonneutrality disappears when the public learns that the trend rate of growth of the
money stock has fallen. In the latter case it disappears when the public resets or renegotiates
ﬁxed nominal prices. (Neither model deals with the length of time required for the public, long
accustomed to a stable monetary regime, to adapt to a monetary regime requiring persistent de-
ﬂation.) In order to understand the effects of their policies, monetary policymakers must then rely
on a combination of models and historical episodes that possess the characteristics of controlled
experiments. Friedman and Schwartz ([1963] 1969, pp. 216–22) list historical episodes where a
prolonged economic slowdown has followed an independent monetary disturbance.       
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adjustment occurred in the form of a reduction in the growth rate of real non-
monetary wealth, which fell 9.3 percentage points over these two intervals.16
An interesting empirical fact is that the long-standing stable relationship
between real money, real GDP, and real wealth continued even through the post-
bubble period. In particular, the relationship between these variables remained
consistent both in the event of negative and positive monetary shocks. This
empirical consistency appears in the stability of the money demand functions
estimated by the BoJ (1997) and Sekine (1998).17 Both authors ﬁnd long-run
stability in the demand for money (M2+CDs) by the Japanese public. That
stability survived the deregulation of the Japanese banking system in the 1980s
(Sawamoto and Ichikawa 1994) and the bubble and post-bubble economy. That
is, both authors ﬁnd a stable relationship between real money, real GDP, and
real wealth (deﬁned to exclude money) that survived the boom and bust period.
Figure 7 shows the positive relationship between the ratio of money to GDP
(real money) and the ratio of nonmonetary wealth to GDP (nonmonetary wealth
is from Sekine [1998]).
Why should a deﬂationary shock have prolonged real consequences? The
answer given here is that the BoJ has created an environment where the
public expects price stability. In that environment, it is hard for corpora-
tions to cut wages.18 Without widespread wage cutting, corporations are re-
luctant to cut prices. Hourly wages continued to rise in the 1990s through
1997. The corresponding rise in real wages increased labor’s share of na-
tional income from 68 percent in the 1980s to about 74 percent in 1998 (DIR
1998–99, p. 7). Correspondingly, corporate proﬁts have fallen and so has the
value of corporate equities. The fall in proﬁts has led corporations to reduce
capital expenditures in 1998, and the fall in wealth has led consumers to spend
less. However, neither of these phenomena are causal; they propagate the mon-
etary shock.
16 Nominal GDP growth went from 6 percent to 1.9 percent. GDP deﬂator growth went from
1.8 percent to 0.7 percent. Real GDP growth went from 4.2 percent to 1.3 percent. Growth in
real nonmonetary wealth went from 9.5 percent to 0.2 percent. The wealth ﬁgure is from Sekine
(1998).
17 Both authors use a cointegration analysis that involves regressing real money (M2+CDs)
on an error-correction term, an opportunity cost variable, and scale variables. The opportunity
cost variable is the difference between a rival interest rate and the own rate on money. The scale
variables are real GDP and nonmonetary wealth. As a measure of wealth, the BoJ uses both
an urban land price index and total ﬁnancial assets of corporate business and personal sectors
from ﬂow of funds data. Sekine uses a broader measure of wealth from the System of National
Accounts. The BoJ estimates its regression over the period 1968Q4 through 1996Q3, and Sekine
estimates his over 1975Q1 through 1994Q4. The long lags in data availability on wealth deter-
mine the end dates. Yash Mehra and Jeffrey Walker, economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, updated the work of the BoJ through 1998Q1. They found continued stability of the
original money demand function.
18 The Japanese system of lifetime employment has limited the ability of corporations to cut
wages. The absence of a credible threat to ﬁre employees limits corporate bargaining power.       
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8. RETURN TO A DIRTY FLOAT
Real GDP revived for a while in the mid-nineties, rising at 3 percent from
1995Q2 through 1997Q1. One contributing factor was a modest rise in money
growth. From 1994Q2 through 1996Q3, money grew at an annualized rate of
3.2 percent. Moreover, inﬂation turned negative. The GDP deﬂator fell at an
annualized rate of 0.7 percent from 1994Q2 through 1996Q4. An appreciating
yen, which rose from about 160 yen to the dollar in 1990 to about 80 in
1995, facilitated the deﬂation. The combination of modest money growth and
deﬂation increased real money balances. As a result, spending revived.
The revival in economic activity came to an end after 1997Q2. The pre-
cipitating factor in the onset of recession was the increase in the consumption
tax rate from 3 to 5 percent on April 1, 1997. That increase produced a rise in
inﬂation. CPI inﬂation, which had been running at a rate of 0.5 percent (year
over year) jumped to almost 2.5 percent through March 1998. The BoJ did not
accommodate the rise in inﬂation with higher money growth. Over the period
subsequent to the tax hike, 1997Q2 through 1998Q1, M2 grew at an annualized
rate of 3.3 percent, only slightly higher than the prior 3 percent growth.19 The
public reduced its real expenditures in response to the fall in its real money
balances. An inventory cycle ampliﬁed the initial shock, and economic activity
continued to decline throughout 1998.
As the economy weakened, the BoJ kept short-term interest rates un-
changed. A primary reason was a fear that lower interest rates would produce
a depreciation of the yen. The same fear kept the BoJ (1998, pp. 12–13) from
aiming for faster money growth:
. . . lower interest rates will reduce households’ interest income. We then
face the question whether consumer conﬁdence, already low, would be further
undermined. There is also the issue of whether lower interest rates would
trigger an additional depreciation of the yen....[T]he possibility cannot be
denied that a depreciation of the yen could, by provoking falls in other Asian
currencies against the U.S. dollar and causing a drop in stock prices in tandem,
amplify people’s anxieties....[I]f a lowering of interest rates is problematic
because it may have an adverse effect on consumer conﬁdence and the yen’s
exchange rate, then we must realize that “monetary expansion” will give rise
to exactly the same problems.
19 The rise in inﬂation in itself would have produced a greater demand for nominal money
and, at the prevailing call money rate of about 0.5 percent, a greater supply. However, the turmoil
in ﬁnancial markets in fall 1997, especially after the failure of Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank, probably augmented the public’s desire to save. (The widespread recognition at
the time that the government would be liable for much of the bad debts of the banking system
raised concerns that the government could have difﬁculty meeting its future pension liabilities.)
Given no change in the level of short-term rates maintained by the BoJ, a reduction in the
equilibrium real interest rate due to this increased desire to save made monetary policy more
contractionary. The continued low rate of growth of money in this period probably reﬂected both
forces.     
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Japan received strong external pressure not to allow a depreciation of the
yen. In fall 1997, the International Monetary Fund negotiated rescue packages
with Paciﬁc Rim countries that required them to raise domestic interest rates
to cushion the fall in their currencies. The fear was that a reduction in interest
rates in Japan would put additional pressure on the currencies of these countries
arising from a falling yen. For example, a falling yen would have put additional
pressure on Korea, whose exports such as steel, cars, and consumer electronics
compete with Japan’s. Moreover, in early summer 1998, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry and the governor of China’s central bank made statements that ob-
servers interpreted as a threat to devalue the renminbi if the yen continued to
fall. On June 17, 1998, concern over weakness in the yen led President Clinton
and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to agree to a joint intervention in the
foreign exchange market to bolster the yen.
On September 9, 1998, the BoJ lowered its unsecured overnight call loan
rate from around 0.5 percent to around 0.25 percent. Commenting on this rate
reduction, a Knight-Ridder (1998) story stated that
A senior ofﬁcial at the Economic Planning Agency...said the Japanese cen-
tral bank had not been able to take easier credit policy as the yen’s weakness
(against the dollar) is feared to exacerbate the economic and ﬁnancial crises
in Asian countries. However, the yen’s recovery from about 145 to the dollar
in mid-August to below 131...h a dgiven the BoJ a “leeway” to ease its
credit policy.
9. MONETARY POLICY IN THE NINETIES
Popular commentary characterizes Japanese monetary policy as “easy” because
of the low level of interest rates. The failure of this allegedly easy monetary
policy to revive economic activity then leads to the conclusion that monetary
policy in Japan is impotent. For example, a Wall Street Journal (1998, p. A19)
article stated
. . . sometimes, a nation’s economy and ﬁnancial system are so sick that con-
ventional links between monetary policy and economic activity are damaged.
. . . Many economists think that Japan has now fallen into a “liquidity trap,”
a bind no major economy has seen since the 1930s. In that state, interest rates
hover near zero, but demand remains stagnant. There is no room to cut rates
more.
It is true that interest rates are at historically low levels in Japan, but
monetary policy is still contractionary if the BoJ maintains short-term rates
above their equilibrium value. The equilibrium interest rate is the sum of the
expected rate of inﬂation (deﬂation) plus the equilibrium real rate. Examination
of each component indicates that the equilibrium value of the interest rate is
near zero. First, expected inﬂation is probably zero or slightly negative. At
present, the level of the CPI is basically steady, but the domestic wholesale     
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price index has fallen steadily since 1991. The result is to lower the equilibrium
interest rate.
Second, the equilibrium real rate of interest is likely close to zero. In the
investment boom of the late 1980s, private investment reached 30 percent of
GDP. In the nineties, the capital stock continued to grow at a 3 percent or
somewhat higher rate (OECD 1998, Figure 30). Continued investment proba-
bly sprang from the belief that Japan would resume normal growth after the
1991–1992 recession. The government further added to the capital stock by
investing about 8 percent of GDP annually in infrastructure.
At the same time, real growth stagnated. Neither retail sales nor industrial
production have grown from early 1992 to the present. It seems likely that the
combination of sluggish domestic growth and continued growth in the capital
stock produced a capital stock that is larger than optimal. Consequently, the
marginal return to capital is probably near zero.
Despite low interest rates, saving remains high in Japan because the rapidly
aging population needs to provide for its retirement. The unfunded liabilities
(on a present-value basis) of Japan’s public pension system are 180 percent
of GDP (Matsuoka 1998). In addition, continued large government deﬁcits are
making the debt/GDP ratio in Japan among the highest in the world. General
government (central and local government and social security funds) debt to
GDP will rise to 130 percent of GDP in ﬁscal year 1999. The problem is
that Japan’s structural (cycle-adjusted) deﬁcit is positive (DIR 1998–99, pp.
21–23).20
This imbalance creates a fear that the government will not be able to meet
its pension obligations. At the same time, those saving for retirement have seen
the value of their assets plunge.21 House and stock prices are back to the levels
of the early 1980s. Many Japanese now own homes whose value falls short
of their mortgage obligation. As a consequence, Japanese saving is driving the
equilibrium real interest rate toward zero.22
20 Without a change in ﬁscal policy, the ratio of debt to GDP will rise indeﬁnitely in Japan
because the product of outstanding government debt and the difference between the long-term
interest rate and nominal GDP growth exceeds the primary ﬁscal balance, where the latter is the
ﬁscal balance excluding interest payments. The structural deﬁcit in Japan, including national and
local government and social security, is 2.4 percent of GDP (DIR 1998–99, p. 23).
21 “Overall, the nation has had to confront cumulative capital losses [from 1990 through
1996] of around one quadrillion yen (about $7 trillion) which represents some two full years’
worth of Japanese GDP and over 14 percent of the nation’s total assets at the end of 1989.
. . . [L]and prices have...fallen [from 1991 through 1998] by an average of around 4 percent
per year” (OECD 1998, pp. 45–50).
22 “The capital losses have had a number of obvious economic effects....Households have
been the biggest losers....T h eresulting amount of negative equity for the owner of a typical
65-square-metre apartment in Central Tokyo purchased at the peak would reach 12 to 15 million
yen ($100,000)....[T]hey [households] have probably boosted saving to try to restore some of
this wealth. . .” (OECD 1998, p. 50).        
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The combination of zero, or negative, expected inﬂation with an equi-
librium real rate near zero means that even the low market rates currently
observed in Japan are consistent with contractionary monetary policy. A num-
ber of economists have argued that the BoJ should look at money growth
rather than interest rates. Speciﬁcally, the BoJ should undertake open market
purchases to increase the monetary base to the extent required to spur money
growth (Friedman 1997; Goodfriend 1997; Laurent 1994, 1995; and Meltzer
1998).
If the BoJ were to expand the money stock, Japanese citizens would ﬁnd
themselves with larger amounts of money in their pockets.23 Some extra money
would be useful for emergencies, but beyond a point, individuals would spend
additional money. Furthermore, the ability of the BoJ to create money is un-
limited. It follows that the BoJ can stimulate spending. That spending would
raise asset prices and spur both investment and consumption.
In opposition to this quantity theory of money argument, others have
claimed that an expansionary monetary policy would be like “pushing on a
string.” The argument is as follows: If higher money growth is to affect the
real economy, that money growth must still work through interest rates. And
interest rates are so low that a further reduction could not make any difference.
However, as economists like Pigou (1947) noted, this possibility ignores the
wealth effects that higher real money balances would create in pushing interest
rates down to zero. Bailey (1971, p. 113) expresses the argument as follows:
Consider...achoice urban site whose expected annual rent is $1 per square
foot....[ A ]rate of interest of 5 percent per year implies a price of $20 per
square foot....Should the rate of interest fall to...0.0000001 percent, [the
price would be] $10 million per square foot, and so on....I ti shard to doubt
that someone would be tempted by the time these [latter] prices were reached
...t oconsume out of capital...enough to overwhelm other households’
saving and eliminate aggregate net saving.
Moreover, at an interest rate close to zero, investors will again ﬁnd the
price of capital so cheap that they will want to accumulate capital. They will
produce goods of great durability. And they will expand exports. Initially, the
exchange rate would fall, but the economy would recover.
23 The BoJ can expand the money stock by undertaking open market purchases, which en-
large bank reserves. In principle, the banks could limit an increase in the money stock by simply
holding the additional reserves in their vaults. However, reserves yield no interest. At some point,
open market purchases would make their reserves large enough that banks would surely purchase
safe, short-term assets like government debt.
From February 1998 through February 1999, M2+CDs increased by 3.5 percent, while
bank reserves increased by 9.4 percent. The BoJ could raise the rate of bank reserve growth to
successively higher levels until it found a level of reserve growth that would produce the desired
money growth. There is no limit to the ability of the BoJ to monetize assets and thus raise bank
reserve growth. (Figures are from BoJ, Reports and Statistics, “Money Stock,” and “Figures on
Reserves,” available on the BoJ web site.)       
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10. WHERE SHOULD JAPAN GO FROM HERE?
The stability of Japanese money demand and the difﬁculty of interpreting the
economic impact of interest rates in an environment of deﬂation and depressed
economic activity suggest that the BoJ should adopt an explicit target for money
(M2+CDs) growth. The targeted growth rate should be high enough to relieve
deﬂationary pressure on the price level. But what growth rate should the BoJ
target? How does the BoJ maintain credibility for a policy of price stability?
The argument for temporarily high money growth is to relieve pressure for
deﬂation. However, high money growth could become a source of instability if
it were to cause the public to believe that inﬂation would become positive.24 A
policy of maintaining price stability would then be destabilizing (see Barro and
Gordon [1983]). The public must believe that money growth above the level
consistent with long-term price stability is temporary. A move to structural
balance in the government deﬁcit would help in that respect. As long as the
government ﬁscal deﬁcit maintains a structural imbalance, as opposed to a
cyclical imbalance, the public might fear that the government would monetize
its debt rather than repay it.25
The Japanese public must remain convinced that a reﬂationary monetary
policy will not produce the alleged speculative excesses of the bubble period.
The BoJ could target a rate of growth of money of, say, 9 percent (double the
long-run growth rate assumed above to be consistent with price stability). At
the same time, it could monitor the value of assets.26 Over the period 1976Q1
to 1987Q1 (the period of stable money growth around a declining trend), real
nonmonetary wealth grew at an annualized rate of 7.6 percent. The BoJ could
lower its money target to 4.5 percent whenever the growth of wealth exceeded
this value. It would also revert to the 4.5 percent ﬁgure when real GDP growth
appeared to have stabilized at a sustainable value.
Japan should allow the money stock to rise sufﬁciently to remove the
downward pressure on the price level. Over the longer run, it should return to
24 This view is in opposition to Krugman’s (1998) view that the BoJ should attempt to
convince the public that it intends to inﬂate in the future.
25 Starting with the locomotive strategy of the Carter Administration, Western governments
have periodically pressured Japan to use deﬁcit spending to stimulate its economy as a way of
increasing its exports. (See the discussion of the Louvre Accord in Section 4.) The idea is that
deﬁcit spending would not only stimulate economic activity but would also raise interest rates.
Higher interest rates would strengthen the yen and make Japanese exports less competitive. An
expansionary monetary policy would also have stimulated economic activity, but by lowering
interest rates. However, lower interest rates would weaken the yen and make Japanese exports
more competitive, thereby exacerbating trade frictions. In actual fact, deﬁcit spending has done
little for Japan. In the 1990s, despite a rise in the level of general government debt from around 70
percent of GDP in 1990 to well over 100 percent by the end of 1998, real growth has stagnated.
26 The BoJ would need to construct a proxy for wealth based on the stock market and recent
information on land prices. The proposal reﬂects a suggestion in Meltzer (1998).     
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its “Golden Age” of monetary policy, 1975 to 1986, when the BoJ stabilized
money growth and nominal expenditure growth to achieve price stability.
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